Cost of Controll - operational programme employment in Austria 2007-2013 - European Social Fund (ESF) and European Rural Development Fund (ERDF) (Working Group on the Structural Funds)

Report ID: 10

Bericht des Rechnungshofes

Kosten der Kontrolle – Operationelles Programm Beschäftigung in Österreich 2007 bis 2013

Prüfungsziele

Ziele der Überprüfung waren die Erhebung der Kosten der Umsetzung des Kontrollsystems für das Operationelle Programm Beschäftigung Österreich 2007 bis 2013 (OP Beschäftigung; kofinanziert durch den Europäischen Sozialfonds (ESF) und nationale Mittel) sowie die Beurteilung, ob die österreichischen Behörden die Vorgaben und Vorschriften der Europäischen Union (EU) bezüglich der Einrichtung des Kontrollsystems eingehalten haben.

Die Ergebnisse dieser Überprüfung fließen auch in die koordinierte Prüfung der Arbeitsgruppe Strukturfonds IV des Kontaktausschusses der Präsidenten des Europäischen Rechnungshofes und der Obersten Rechnungskontrollbehörden (ORKB) der EU–Mitgliedstaaten ein, an der die ORKB von zwölf EU–Mitgliedstaaten teilnahmen.

Kosten der Kontrolle – ein EU–weites Thema

Bei der zwischen der Europäischen Kommission (Kommission) und den Mitgliedstaaten geteilten Mittelverwaltung ist der Mitgliedstaat — ungeachtet der Gesamtverantwortung der Kommission — auf Basis der gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Vorgaben für die Verwaltung und Kontrolle der EU–Mittel auf staatlicher Ebene zuständig.

Da der Europäische Rechnungshof — beginnend mit 1994 — insgesamt stets nur eingeschränkte jährliche Zuverlässigkeitserklärungen zum Rechnungsabschluss der EU abgab, setzte die Kommission in den letzten Jahren zahlreiche Maßnahmen zur Stärkung der nationalen Verwaltungs– und Kontrollsysteme. Die gesetzten Maßnahmen erhöhten die Komplexität der Verwaltung und der Kontrolle der Förderungsmaßnahmen. Dies führte zu Diskussionen über die damit verbundenen Kosten, insbesondere im Hinblick auf deren Verhältnismäßigkeit zum Förderungsvolumen.

Im April 2009 forderte das Europäische Parlament eine Bewertung der Kontrollkosten aller Ausgabenbereiche der EU – auch unter Einbeziehung der Kosten der Mitgliedstaaten. Diese Bewertung sollte als Basis für einen interinstitutionellen Dialog zwischen Europä- ischem Parlament, Kommission und Rat über das „hinnehmbare Risiko“ (also jene Risikoschwelle, ab der die Kontrolle mehr kostet, als sie bringt) dienen.

Kosten der Kontrolle des OP Beschäftigung

Im Rahmen der Kontrolle des OP Beschäftigung entstanden bisher Kosten aus der Ex–ante–Evaluation, der Einrichtung des Verwaltungs– und Kontrollsystems, der Projektauswahl, der Kontrolle der Projekte an Hand von Unterlagen und vor Ort (First Level Control), dem Monitoring des OP, der Bescheinigung der Ausgaben und der Ex–post–Prüfungstätigkeit (Second Level Control). Für alle diese Felder fielen in erster Linie Personalkosten an, weiters direkte Sachkosten (z.B. IT) sowie Gemeinkosten (z.B. Mieten, Verwaltungs– Overheads).

Effectiveness of measures for improving the status of Lake Peipus

Report ID: 54

The National Audit Office of Estonia audited whether the state is aware of the sources of pollution influencing the status of Lake Peipus and whether the measures implemented for the protection of the lake have helped to reduce the pollution load and will ensure the good status of Lake Peipus by 2015.

According to the NAO the current activity of the Estonian state does not ensure the reduction of the pollution load of Lake Peipus so that it would help to achieve the lake’s good status by the year 2015 to meet the requirements of the European Union, or by the next deadline in 2021.

Border crossing of cargo at the land border between Estonia and Russia

Report ID: 55

The National Audit Office analyzed the work of Estonian border inspection points on the land border between Estonia and Russia. The goal was to point out to Estonian state agencies how they could make it easier for goods vehicles to cross the border and thereby reduce the queues at the border.

The Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation audited the activities of Russia’s state agencies at the border inspection points on the land border between Russia and Estonia. The opinions of both audit institutions were presented in a joint document.

The audit concluded that the organization of vehicles crossing the land border between Estonia and Russia improved considerably in 2011 when waiting areas were established by the border and an electronic queue was introduced. Vehicles are no longer queuing on Estonian roads, drivers know when they can expect to enter the Estonian border inspection point and do not have to waste their time on spending days in the queue. However, the introduction of electronic queues did not increase the capacity of the border inspection point. Sometimes, people still have to wait for several days before they can cross the border. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Police and Border Guard Board, and the Tax and Customs Board, reducing the waiting times depends primarily on the work organization in the Federal Customs Service of Russia and in the border inspection points on the border between Russia and Estonia. Audit operations in Estonia and examining the organization of work in the Russian border inspection points opposite the Estonian ones give the National Audit Office reason to believe that this is likely to be the case. However, there also reserves that can be used to make the work of Estonian border inspection points more efficient.

Parallel audit of the use of public funds for motorway construction

Report ID: 65

The European motorway network forms the backbone of the passenger and freight transport in the European Union. As this situation will remain unchanged for the time being, investments in the expansion and maintenance of the European Motorway network are very important. Thus, examining the use of public funds for financing motorway construction projects is a key responsibility of Supreme Audit Institutions.

This report informs about the findings produced by the parallel audit missions regarding the funds spent on building the A 73 motorway (A 73) in Germany (section Thuringia/Bavaria satate border - Lichten - fels) and the D 1 motorway (D 1) in the Slovak Republic (section Vrtizer - Hricovske Podhradie). The audit missions focused on the public procurement procedure and a comparison of building standards and costs relative to the A 73 and the D 1. In the years 2009 to 2011, the audits were performed by the German SAI and the Slovak SAI in their respective country in order to share their findings and make comparisons.

The parallel audits found that by awarding the public works contract concerning the D 1 to a general contractor, competition was restricted placing small and medium sized enterprises at a disadvantage.

The expenses on building the two motorways increased considerably owing to the general increase in construction costs, the hike in value added tax (VAT) and, above all, the inadequate preparatory works performed by the respective national road works administrations. The two administrations did not or not adequately invite tenders for required work and services, with the result that supplementary agreements had to be subsequently concluded. Since the costs stipulated in these agreements were fixed in an environment with reduced or even no competition the contractors were able to enforce higher prices.

The Government Successfully Borrows in the Domestic Market: How to Optimize this Process and to Reduce Debt Management Costs

Report ID: 118

The National Audit Office of Lithuania carried out an audit of the management of the debt on behalf of the State, during which the efficiency of the management of Government securities (hereinafter – GS) issued in the domestic market was assessed. The audit covered the period between 2006-2009; in some cases data of 2010 was also used for comparison. The Government borrows in the domestic market through issuance of bonds – GS with maturity of over one year , with maturity of 3, 5, 7 and 10 years, and Treasury bills – GS with maturity of under one year, with maturity of 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months.

Domestic GS comprise about 30 per cent of the debt on behalf of the State. Until the end of 2008, GS were issued in the domestic market only through auctions. Until February 2009, in the domestic market of Lithuania GS auctions were organized by the Bank of Lithuania, later on – AB NASDAQ OMX Vilnius. In 2008 with the start of economic crisis, the Government started to issue GS in the domestic market not only through auctions, but also through private placements concluding a contract with creditors, as well as resumed the issuance of savings bonds. The Ministry of Finance successfully borrows in the domestic market: organization of GS auctions conforms to recommendations of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as best foreign practice. During the audit no substantial problems related to the borrowing and debt management of the Ministry of Finance were detected; issues indicated in the report and recommendations given would allow to improve the efficiency of the GS management: i.e., to develop the domestic market, increase the demand of GS, which in the long run would help to reduce the debt management costs. The Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy of the Government does not provide for the objective to develop and maintain the efficient domestic market; no analysis was conducted as to what is the maximum possibility to borrow in the domestic market. Establishment of the above mentioned objective and clear means to implement it would allow increasing the demand of GS issued in the domestic market, independence from foreign market and reduce the debt management costs in the future.

GS auctions in the domestic market are insufficiently regular and predictable. In 2nd half of 2006 – 2009 the Ministry of Finance systematically cancelled previously announced auctions, which had a negative impact on auction participants and investors. Such a practice raises the distrust in auction organizers, hampers the market development, and increases the debt management costs in the long–run. The Ministry of Finance does not announce the amount of the issued GS; issuing GS in the domestic market, did not always follow the established borrowing programmes and calendars. Appropriate planning of the borrowing need, announcement of the information about how regularly Treasury bills and bonds will be issued and about the planned amount of the GS issue would enable to attract more investors and develop the domestic market, as well as ensure the transparency of the Government plans. The Ministry of Finance does not use auction evaluation indicators, which show the interest of investors in Government securities with various maturities. Use of Bit-to-Cover or other evaluation indicators showing the interest of investors in auctions would allow attracting more investors. The audit pointed out that issuance and maturity dates of GS were not always closely linked to the need for public cash on respective days. The Ministry of Finance should ensure the balance between the regular nature of borrowing and need for public cash: it would enable to optimize the planning of borrowing and help to reduce the costs of interests. In order to eliminate the possible risk of settlement between auction participants, to ensure the proper understanding of information, stability and transparency, requirements to auction participants issued by the Ministry of Finance should set the minimum and maximum amount of GS, which has to / may be purchased by one auction participant / investor in one auction, as well as to set requirements for non-competitive bids. Seeking to attract the interest of possible new auction participants and potential investors, the Ministry of Finance should announce more information on its website related to the GS issuance process, carrying out of auctions; explain what information has to be submitted along with the bid for GS by auction participants, as well as particularities of various bids and advantages to individual groups of investors. We want to point out that issues set out in the report and the terminology used is technical, specific and in many cases meant only for experts.